

FINDING BALANCE IN U.S. INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY

A report on the
the allocation of

**diplomatic,
military, and
economic
investments**

since the Pivot

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ten years ago, President Obama announced the Pivot to Asia. **The intention was to shift U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic investments to the region.** President Trump upended U.S. foreign policy. But despite reversing many of President Obama's policies, this core intention remained intact. Policy statements continued to emphasize both the singular importance of the region and the importance of using all elements of U.S. power.

Given the continuity of U.S. intentions, it should be possible to see a shift in all three areas – diplomatic, military, and economic. This report examines whether this balance exists.

There is no clear definition of a balanced approach. Indeed, the allocation of foreign policy investments is a contentious and ever-present debate. But at a minimum, the continuity of U.S. intentions supports a conservative definition. Policy statements imply that **a balanced approach is one where the Indo-Pacific becomes a primary destination for each investment area - diplomatic, military, and economic.** And these statements imply that this approach is a precondition for any successful Indo-Pacific strategy.

An imbalanced approach in the Indo-Pacific undermines U.S. interests. For one, major imbalances diminish U.S. credibility. When actions fall short of words, Indo-Pacific countries will have less confidence in future U.S. intentions. Second (and more important), major imbalances risk policy failure. For example:

- **An approach that lacks diplomatic power** will fail to strengthen relationships and manage tensions. Climate change also demands U.S. diplomatic engagement.
- **An approach that lacks military power** will fail to deter aggression. Many Indo-Pacific countries also seek U.S. military engagement.
- **An approach that lacks economic power** will fail to support American workers and businesses. And competing with China's economic influence requires U.S. economic engagement.

This report is about finding balance in U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. My goal was to assess the allocation of foreign policy investments since the Pivot. I focused on whether the U.S. has sufficient means to achieve its desired outcomes. To do this, I answered two questions:

- First, **where are U.S. investments in the Indo-Pacific imbalanced?**
- And second, **what can be done to fix these imbalances?**

To answer the first question, I assessed whether the Indo-Pacific became a primary destination for all three investment areas. And if not, I assessed whether there was a clear and sustained shift in that direction.

I built a massive database of U.S. investments. This database draws from a range of government and academic sources. This includes diplomatic appropriations, treaties and international agreements, foreign assistance, leader travel, legislative hearings, study abroad programs, military deployments, arms sales, direct investment, and international trade.

This process culminated in an unprecedented combination of data on U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic investments. Alone, each source tells an incomplete story. But together, they provide a much more comprehensive view of U.S. engagement. This makes it possible to see how much the U.S. shifted its attention and resources to the Indo-Pacific.

I found that, **over the past decade, the biggest imbalance was a growing gap between diplomatic and military investments.** There was a clear and sustained increase in the share of military investments to the Indo-Pacific. The share of economic investments rose too (though at a slower rate). But the share of diplomatic investments remained static. These relative trends do not capture familiar trends – such as cuts to the Department of State under the Trump administration. When accounting for topline changes, the imbalance is even bigger.

In many cases, diplomatic investments in the Indo-Pacific even decreased. The investments that fell the most are intertwined with security and economic efforts. After the Pivot, the U.S. entered fewer security and economic agreements than the decade before. While this happened in all regions, the fall was even steeper in the Indo-Pacific. The region ranked fourth in the number of new agreements (behind Europe, the Americas, and Africa), despite its primary importance. Reversing these trends requires an increase in diplomatic attention and resources to the Indo-Pacific.

To answer the second question, I listened to the perspectives of policy experts and the American public. This included fielding a nationally representative survey. I designed the survey to answer three questions: How much do Americans value diplomatic, military, and economic engagement? How much do Americans support increased engagement in the Indo-Pacific? And how do American views change based on the information they receive? Answering these questions helps to gauge the feasibility of different policy options.

This process culminated in a survey with over two thousand respondents. I found that, **Americans express strong support for increasing diplomatic engagement. Americans are more split on the importance of the Indo-Pacific** – especially when it comes to sending more investments to the region. But I embedded a randomized control trial within the survey. Some respondents received statements about the Indo-Pacific prior to the survey (such as statements about the need to cooperate more in the Indo-Pacific or compete more with China). **When told about the importance of the Indo-Pacific, Americans are far more inclined to support investments in the region.** A focus on the need to cooperate more in the Indo-Pacific causes a bigger increase in support than a focus on the need to compete more with China. These results reveal considerable latent public support for diplomatic investments and reinforce the need for more public outreach about the region.

After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, some argue that the U.S. should slow its shift to the Indo-Pacific to better balance diplomatic, military, and economic investments between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. This perspective implies that the balance is already (or soon-to-be) in favor of the Indo-Pacific. My research shows that this is not the case.

Instead, **Russia's invasion reinforces the need to increase diplomatic investments in the Indo-Pacific.** First, it shows the inherent risk of military expansion. This risk needs to be managed – and diplomacy helps do this. Second, it shows the need for strong relationships and institutions. No amount of diplomacy can eliminate the risk of conflict with China. But it can strengthen the response to conflict. The rapid and resolute response to Russia's invasion shows the value of having diplomatic investments in place. U.S.-European relationships have benefited from more attention and resources. This same level of attention and resources is needed in the Indo-Pacific, where the long-term stakes are higher.

A boost in diplomatic investments would have a transformative impact on U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. This report lays out detailed analysis and recommendations that show why more diplomatic investments are needed to achieve U.S. goals.



Thank you to everyone who
helped me along the way

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Ten years ago, the Obama administration announced the Pivot to Asia. The intention was to shift U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic investments to the region. Despite its many differences, the Trump administration kept this core intention. Ten years after the Pivot, it should be possible to see a major shift in all three areas. This report examines whether this balance exists.

Problem

Imbalanced investments in the Indo-Pacific undermine U.S. interests.

The following sections clarify the meaning of balance and the costs of imbalance.

Goal

The goal of this report is to assess the allocation of U.S. foreign policy investments since the Pivot. Any successful Indo-Pacific strategy must have clear ends, effective ways, and sufficient means. This report focuses on whether the U.S. has sufficient means. It does not seek to reimagine the goals of the new strategy. But it does consider how the balance of investments impacts desired outcomes. To do this, I focused on two main questions.

Research Questions

Where are U.S. investments in the Indo-Pacific imbalanced?

Did the Indo-Pacific become a primary destination for diplomatic, economic, and military investments? If not, was there a clear and sustained shift in that direction?

What can be done to fix these imbalances?

Are there feasible steps that could reduce major imbalances that emerged over the past decade? If so, would Americans support these steps?

Assumptions

These assumptions are based on the goals of the current and last two administrations.

- The U.S. should prioritize the Indo-Pacific.
- Advancing U.S. interests requires the proper allocation and integration of diplomatic, military, and economic investments.
- The allocation of investments must be balanced in support of a coherent strategic design.
- Investments should support increased engagement in South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania.
- It is essential to articulate the diplomatic, security, and economic outcomes necessary to support U.S. interests.
- U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is executed in the context of the broader U.S. National Security Strategy.

BACKGROUND

BACKGROUND

The Pivot

In November 2011, President Obama spoke to Australia's parliament to announce that the U.S. was turning its attention to the Asia-Pacific.¹ This speech launched the Pivot. The rationale was simple. The Asia-Pacific was the world's fastest growing region. Any number of metrics pointed to its significance (from its population size to its economic scale). The region's rise presented new opportunities and challenges. This demanded more U.S. attention and resources which, for the past decade, had focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

China's rise was also a motivating factor. Preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in the Asia-Pacific was an enduring American goal. For the first time in decades, China's new, outsized influence in the region made the emergence of a regional hegemon a distinct possibility. With U.S. attention elsewhere (along with a devastating financial crisis), many leaders doubted U.S. staying power.

From the start, the intention was to shift U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic investments to the region. This was embedded throughout President Obama's speech. Secretary Clinton also focused on this intention in her *Foreign Policy* article on the Pivot.² After the inception of the Pivot, this intention was repeated by many leaders across the federal government. Sometimes the words changed (e.g. "political" instead of "diplomatic"; "strategic" instead of "military"). But the message was clear. The U.S. was turning its attention to the Asia-Pacific. And this shift would involve all elements of its power.

Continuity of Policy

Despite unprecedented changes to U.S. foreign policy over the past decade, the core intention of the Pivot remained intact. A few changes were more superficial. For some, the term "Pivot" fell out of favor and was replaced with "Rebalance". Later, the term "Asia-Pacific" fell out of favor and was replaced with "Indo-Pacific". But there were deeper changes as well.

The Trump administration upended U.S. foreign policy. President Trump reversed many of President Obama's major policies. This included refusing to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the main economic achievement of the Pivot. He also took a more competitive stance towards China. Despite widespread resistance to his policies, many in the foreign policy community supported this less cooperative stance.

Even amid these changes to Indo-Pacific strategy, the core intention of the Pivot remained intact. Policy statements continued to emphasize the singular importance of the Indo-Pacific. And these statements made it clear that the U.S. would continue to shift its diplomatic, military, and economic investments to the region. For example, while TPP fell through, the intention was to fill the void with a series of bilateral economic deals. Like the Obama administration, the Trump administration also signaled that it would increase engagement in the entire region: South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania. Graphic 1 shows some of the examples of Indo-Pacific policy statements over the past decade.

Given the continuity of U.S. intentions, it should be possible to see a shift in all three areas – diplomatic, military, and economic.

STATEMENTS ON INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

President Obama's speech to Australia's parliament · 2011

The U.S. is “turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region...”

“...in partnership with allies and friends, and with every element of American power. So let there be no doubt: In the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in.”³

Secretary Clinton's *Foreign Policy* article · 2011

“One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will ... be to lock in a substantially increased investment – **diplomatic, economic, strategic**, and otherwise – in the Asia-Pacific region.”⁴

Secretary Carter at the Center for Strategic and International Studies · 2013

While laying out substantial military shifts... “our Rebalance to Asia is mostly an **economic** and **political** concept – not a **military** one.”⁵

THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

Department of Defense: Indo-Pacific Strategy Report · 2019

“Embedding...free and open principles will require efforts across the spectrum of our agencies and capabilities: **diplomatic initiatives, governance capacity building, economic cooperation and commercial advocacy**, and **military cooperation**.”⁶

Secretary Pompeo on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy · 2019

“President Trump has made U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific region a top priority of his Administration.”

“The United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy is driving a tangible increase in resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific region.”⁷

Department of State: A Free and Open Indo-Pacific · 2019

“Under President Trump’s leadership, the United States is implementing a whole-of-government strategy...the strategy focuses on three pillars: **economics, governance**, and **security**. This report outlines U.S. activities in each of the three pillars (and)...builds on DoD’s June 2019 report by covering the efforts of the whole of U.S. government.”⁸

Meaning of Balance

There is no clear definition of a balanced approach in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, the allocation of foreign policy investments is a contentious and ever-present debate. But at a minimum, the continuity of U.S. intentions supports a conservative definition. In general, a balanced approach is one where investment allocation reflects priorities (and probabilities of achieving desired outcomes). The consistent priorities expressed in policy statements make it possible to specify what would constitute a balanced approach in the Indo-Pacific.

This report considers a balanced approach to be one where the Indo-Pacific becomes a primary destination for each investment category - diplomatic, military, and economic. This is based on two core elements embedded in policy statements over the past decade.

1. The Indo-Pacific should become the primary theater for the U.S.
2. Achieving this goal requires a major shift in all instruments of national power – diplomatic, military, and economic.

While fundamental debates remain, these two elements have broad support among the foreign policy community.

A balanced approach is one where the Indo-Pacific becomes a primary destination for each investment category - diplomatic, military, and economic.

Based on this definition, I assessed whether the Indo-Pacific became a primary destination for the three investment categories. And if not, I assessed whether there was a clear and sustained shift in that direction. An imbalance exists when there is no clear and sustained shift.

This definition does not imply equality. While policy statements emphasize the importance of shifting all instruments of national power, they do not suggest that this shift should be equal. And equality is unrealistic. For example, embassies are spread across the world, while major security threats are more concentrated. So it makes sense that diplomatic personnel are more dispersed than U.S. military personnel. Some discrepancies within categories are also possible. For example, perhaps the Indo-Pacific should not be a top destination for foreign assistance. But on the whole, the Indo-Pacific should be a primary theater for all instruments of U.S. power.

Costs of Imbalance

First, major imbalances undermine U.S. credibility. Balance is at the core of U.S. policy statements. These statements say that the U.S. will shift its diplomatic, military, and economic investments to the Indo-Pacific. Because of this, failing to follow through undermines U.S. credibility. For example, inaction on the economic side will lead Indo-Pacific countries to be less confident in future claims that the U.S. will prioritize economic engagement. Allies and partners will view the U.S. as less predictable. Competitors and adversaries will be able to point to the lack of American credibility.

Second, an approach that relies too much on one form of power carries major risks. Balance is at the core of U.S. policy statements for a reason. If the U.S. hopes to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon, it will need to draw on its diplomatic, military, and economic power. And if it hopes to achieve its broader aims, it will need to draw on these sources of power even more. A lack of investment in one area not only impedes progress but risks dangerous consequences.

Lack of diplomatic power

An approach that lacks diplomatic power will backfire. U.S. allies and partners are perhaps America's biggest competitive advantage. Maintaining these relationships requires diplomatic attention and resources. A lack of diplomatic power also diminishes the ability to manage tensions and address transnational challenges.

Diplomatic power is needed to prevent conflict. Even with close allies, single events can disrupt the entire relationship. Ensuring that these events do not spiral out of control requires diplomats who can smooth over sensitive issues. The need is even stronger with adversaries. Without diplomats who can communicate U.S. intentions with clarity, single events can lead to miscalculations – which risks war.

U.S. intentions are not only communicated by its diplomats but also by the balance of its investments. For years, the U.S. has said that it does not seek to contain China. But if U.S. hard power shifts to the region while soft power remains behind, these claims may fall on deaf ears. Even limited cooperation will be difficult, and this will impede progress on transnational challenges.

Without sufficient diplomatic investments, the effectiveness of military and economic power wanes. For example, given the distances involved in the Indo-Pacific, base and access agreements are essential for a sustainable military presence. And alone, U.S. economic influence cannot match the scale of China's regional economic influence. But when paired with the collective influence of its allies and partners, this is possible. Pairing this influence requires effective diplomacy. And trying to build multilateral relationships in a region where multilateralism is relatively new requires even more investments.

Lack of military power

An approach that lacks military power will fail to meet partner needs. Indo-Pacific countries want more security cooperation. The demand for a U.S. military presence is driven by its stabilizing influence. For example, even though the U.S. has a stronger military, Indo-Pacific countries are more inclined to balance Chinese power. This is because the U.S. is often viewed as less of a threat – in part because of its geographic distance from other Indo-Pacific countries.⁹ Thus, U.S. military investments are often welcomed.

An approach that lacks military power will fail to deter aggression. Strengthening U.S. capabilities in the region increases the costs of aggression. Strengthening (and integrating) Indo-Pacific partner capabilities also supports this goal. Both types of military investment are key to preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon.

Military investments are also needed to address transnational challenges. Many of these challenges require military capabilities – such as ships to prevent maritime piracy or provide disaster relief. Military power also makes diplomatic and economic power more effective. For example, freedom of navigation exercises can be used to help uphold international law. And a stable security environment makes free flowing international trade possible. Lastly, a strong U.S. military presence provides one of the clearest signs of U.S. staying power in the region.

Lack of economic power

An approach that lacks economic power will fail to support American workers and businesses. Much of the region's promise lies in its enormous economic potential. Economic engagement is key to tapping this potential. Given the region's expanding markets and interconnected supply chains, this element is central to American growth. Economic engagement also shows Indo-Pacific countries that the U.S. has a positive vision for the region. Without it, a growing U.S. presence will be viewed more as a form of traditional geopolitical competition.

Even within the context of competition, economic power is essential. Competing with China's expanding influence demands U.S. economic engagement. The U.S. may not be able to match Chinese investments one-for-one (such as the Belt and Road Initiative). But the U.S. retains considerable economic advantages (such as its ability to shape international rules). Without leveraging these advantages, the U.S. risks being pushed out of the region in the long-term.

Economic power is also essential to address transnational challenges. For example, economic assistance can alleviate poverty. And economic agreements can be a vehicle to protect workers' rights and enforce climate standards. As the ultimate foundation for diplomatic and military power, economic power also supports American statecraft.

The next section focuses on finding imbalances that developed over the past decade.



STAGE ONE

FINDING IMBALANCES

STAGE ONE: FINDING IMBALANCES

Methods

To find imbalances, I built a massive database of U.S. investments. The evidence that I collected is wide-ranging. It draws from a range of government and academic sources. Each source represents a diplomatic, military, and/or economic investment. And each source was selected based on Indo-Pacific policy statements. Graphic 2 provides a snapshot of all sources.

This process culminated in an unprecedented combination of data on U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic investments. While there is no shortage of perspectives on Indo-Pacific strategy, this analysis fills a gap in the literature. This is one of many ways to look at this topic.

Alone, each source tells an incomplete story. But together, they provide a much more comprehensive view of U.S. engagement. This makes up for a shortcoming of existing analysis. Instead of focusing on big-ticket moves (such as the failure of TPP or the success of the AUKUS deal), this analysis goes beneath the surface. These big-ticket moves are very important. But fulfilling the promise of these moves requires substantial resources and attention during the implementation stage. Analysis of Indo-Pacific strategy often overlooks such investments.

My goal was to use this database to compare the level of investments in the Indo-Pacific, before and after the Pivot. I focused on collecting data from the past twenty years. These sources are comprehensive. For example, the data on U.S. Direct Investment (USDI) includes every USDI amount, ranging from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, for every available year. This makes it possible to see how much the U.S. shifted its attention and resources to the Indo-Pacific.

One reason for the lack of existing analysis on imbalances is the accessibility of government information. Compared to most countries, the U.S. government does a good job of making its information available to the public. But it could do a much better job of making this information accessible. Foreign policy data, in particular, is very difficult to work with. I spent most of my time with this project collecting and transforming data to make it usable.

For example, *Treaties in Force* provides comprehensive information on U.S. treaties and international agreements.¹⁰ This source is essential for tracking diplomatic progress. But in its current form (a large unstructured report), it is impossible to track trends. I contacted the Department of State's Office of Treaty Affairs to see if there was another version. But I was told that there is not.

Because of this, the source is rarely mentioned in foreign policy analysis – despite being such a key indicator of diplomatic progress. Information must be extracted manually. This requires not only considerable time to extract, but also a longer process to ensure that all information is captured accurately. This took several months. Making sources like *Treaties in Force* useable for meaningful analysis requires a different skillset from most foreign policy analysts. And most of all, it requires patience and tedious work.

Despite the difficulty of working with foreign policy data, the potential payoff is huge. Having key diplomatic, military, and economic information in a structured format makes it possible to bring everything together. This makes it possible to have a clearer picture of foreign policy investments. This comprehensive approach also avoids the inherent pitfalls of cherry-picking.

THE SOURCES

DIPLOMATIC APPROPRIATIONS · *U.S. Department of State*

- U.S. Department of State budget
- U.S. Department of State positions

TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS · *U.S. Department of State*

- Security Agreements
- Economic Agreements
- Other Agreements (environment, space, science & technology, etc.)

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE · *U.S. Department of State, USAID*

- Security Assistance
- Economic Assistance

LEADER TRAVEL · *U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense*

- Foreign trips by the U.S. President
- Foreign trips by the U.S. Secretary of State
- Foreign trips by the U.S. Secretary of Defense
- Trips to the U.S. by foreign leaders

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS · *U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate*

- House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings
- Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings

STUDENTS ABROAD · *U.S. Department of State, Open Doors*

- Study abroad trips by American students

MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS · *U.S. Department of Defense, Stimson Center, IISS*

- Troop deployments
- Ship deployments
- Aircraft deployments

ARMS SALES · *U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of State, SIPRI*

- Foreign Military Sales
- Direct Commercial Sales

DIRECT INVESTMENT · *U.S. Department of Commerce*

- Foreign direct investment to the U.S.
- Direct Investment from the U.S.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE · *Harvard University, United Nations, IMF*

- Imports to the U.S.
- Exports from the U.S.

Value of Sources

Diplomatic appropriations are one of the best indicators for how the Department of State divides its attention and resources. It shows how large the U.S. diplomatic budget is for each country and region. It also shows how many Americans (and foreigners) are serving in U.S. diplomatic positions around the world.

- The *Congressional Budget Justification* is the source for this category. It provides an appropriations breakdown of regional bureaus. This document is released each year and displays the budget and number of positions for each regional office and post. It shows the actual, estimated, and requested amount for three years. For example, the FY16 justification displays FY14 actual, FY15 estimated, and FY16 requested appropriations.¹¹

Treaties and international agreements are one of the best indicators for how engaged the U.S. is throughout the world. It reflects how much progress there is in finding common ground and making deals with other countries. It also reflects priority levels (such as which topics and regions get the most diplomatic attention). There is also a security and economic focus for many agreements.

- *Treaties in Force* is the source for this category. The Department of State releases this document each year (with some exceptions). It lists all U.S. treaties and international agreements on record with the department.¹²

Foreign assistance is another indicator of U.S. diplomatic engagement. It shows how much the U.S. is providing to each country in each year. Similar to international agreements, this category can be a useful gauge for military and economic attention.

- *ForeignAssistance.gov* is the source for this category. It provides comprehensive data on U.S. foreign assistance. It covers all assistance provided by various U.S. departments.¹³

Leader travel is an indicator of U.S. engagement at the executive level. It shows how much attention U.S. leaders are willing and able to devote to each country and region. It also shows how much attention foreign leaders are willing and able to devote to the U.S. This is a helpful measure of high-level diplomatic attention.

- The Department of State and the Department of Defense are the sources for this category. The Office of the Historian at the Department of State provides comprehensive information on the travels of the U.S. President and Secretary of State. It also provides comprehensive information on foreign leader travel. The Historical Office at the Department of Defense provides comprehensive information on the travels of the U.S. Secretary of Defense.¹⁴

Congressional hearings are an indicator of U.S. engagement at the legislative level. It shows how much attention U.S. Representatives and Senators are devoting to each country and region. Foreign policy investments rely on the expertise and support of elected officials. As the two committees responsible for foreign affairs, they determine how much Congressional attention is given to regions and topics. Issues that receive more attention tend to receive more resources.

- The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee are the sources for this category. Both committees provide detailed information on their hearings.¹⁵

Students abroad are an indicator of youth engagement in other countries. It shows how many Americans decide to study abroad each year. Study abroad programs provide an opportunity to learn about another country's society and culture. They can even spark an interest in pursuing a career tied to the region of study.

- *Open Doors* is the source for this category. This source is developed by the Institute of International Education and funded by the Department of State. It provides comprehensive data on where Americans study abroad.¹⁶

Military deployments are one of the best indicators of military engagement. This includes the location of U.S. troops, ships, and aircraft. This information reflects the priorities of the national security community. It shows where U.S. military power is focused.

- The Stimson Center and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) are the sources for this category. Both draw on information from the Department of Defense. The Stimson Center provides information on U.S. troop deployments. IISS provides information on ship and aircraft deployments. This includes major warships (aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, large surface combatants, and submarines), support ships, fighter aircraft, and other aircraft.¹⁷

Arms sales are another important indicator of military engagement. This includes both Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales. This information shows which countries are buying and receiving the most military equipment from the U.S., by dollar value. This information also includes defense services.

- SIPRI is the source for this category. It provides original documents from the Department of Defense and the Department of State. For Direct Commercial Sales, it includes annual reports on arms sales, known as the “Section 655” report. For Foreign Military Sales, it includes annual reports on arms sales from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.¹⁸

Direct investment is another key indicator of economic engagement. It shows how attractive the U.S. is to foreign investors and how attractive other countries are to American investors.

- The Bureau of Economic Analysis, within the Department of Commerce, is the source for this category. It provides comprehensive data on direct investment in the U.S. by foreign investors and direct investment in foreign countries by American investors.¹⁹

International trade is a key indicator of economic engagement. It shows the amount of goods and services exchanged with each country.

- Harvard University is the source for this category. Its *Atlas of Economic Complexity* provides comprehensive goods and services data. For goods, it draws on data from the United Nations. For services, it draws on data from the International Monetary Fund.²⁰

Both economic sources are important, but difficult for the U.S. government to influence. Some of the diplomatic sources also capture forms of economic engagement, which comes up later.

Post-Pivot Findings

The share of diplomatic investments to the Indo-Pacific remains low

Graphic 3 shows the share of U.S. investments to the Indo-Pacific, before and after the Pivot. The grey dots represent the share before (ten-year average: 2002 – 2011). And the colored dots represent the share after (ten-year average: 2012 – 2021).

After the Pivot, the share of military investments to the Indo-Pacific increased more than economic and diplomatic investments. Military investments also had a higher starting point. The clear shift in military investments can be explained, in part, by the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan. But this is not the full story. It can also be explained by major increases in military attention and resources.


Compared to military ones, economic investments had a lower starting point and a smaller increase. Graphic 3 also shows how the regional trade deficit increased. And it shows that, despite increasing international trade, the share of direct investment between the U.S. and the region remains quite low. Compared to military and diplomatic ones, these investments are less influenced by government policies. But these key indicators of economic engagement can still be influenced by the next category: diplomatic investments.

The lack of diplomatic investments is the main imbalance of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. The share of diplomatic investments had the lowest starting point and remained low. Compared to military and economic investments, there was much less variation. The share for most diplomatic investments hovered around the same level (between 15 – 20 percent). The share for some types even dropped. This includes two of the most important types: Department of State positions and treaties and international agreements.

These differences are important because they reflect a sharp disparity between diplomatic and military attention. For the military, it is clear that the Indo-Pacific is now the primary theater. For all but two investment types (Foreign Military Sales and other aircraft), the Indo-Pacific is the top destination for U.S. military investments. For diplomacy, it is just as clear that the Indo-Pacific is not a primary theater. Not a single investment type has the Indo-Pacific as its top destination.

Graphic 3

After the Pivot, the share of diplomatic investments to the Indo-Pacific remains low





Graphic 4

As the military shifts to the Indo-Pacific, diplomacy remains far behind

MILITARY

CENTER OF GRAVITY

(excluding Western Hemisphere)



*center of gravity is calculated using an average of countries' locations weighted by each category

The relative gap between military and diplomatic investments is not new

While reading *The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia*, I noticed a chart by McKinsey that shows the world's economic center of gravity (a weighted average of gross domestic product and country locations).²¹ It shows how the economic center of gravity is quickly shifting back to the Indo-Pacific. I tried this same approach with U.S. diplomatic and military investments. My goal was to see how diplomatic and military centers of gravity changed over the past few decades. To do this, I used the six investment types with data extending back to 1991. This offers a wider lens for how priorities changed after the Cold War. Graphic 4 shows this view.

After the Cold War, U.S. diplomatic and military investments diverged. Over the past three decades, military investments shifted towards the Indo-Pacific. All three types (troops, ships, and aircraft) shifted eastwards in the 1990s. Despite a diversion to Afghanistan and Iraq, this shift continued over the past decade. For diplomacy, there was no discernable shift. Instead, the centers of gravity remained far from the Indo-Pacific (roughly the same place that they were three decades ago). And the direction for all three types (leader travel, treaties and international agreements, and foreign assistance) was more haphazard. While the military centers of gravity had a clear trajectory (besides the diversion), the diplomatic centers of gravity had an incoherent path. This view provides further evidence of an imbalance.

These graphics only show relative changes. They do not capture familiar trends – such as cuts to the Department of State under the Trump administration. When accounting for these topline changes, the imbalance is even bigger.

Most diplomatic investments in the Indo-Pacific decreased

Graphic 5 shows the total investments in the Indo-Pacific, before and after the Pivot. Similar to before, the grey dots represent the total before (ten-year average: 2002 – 2011). And the colored dots represent the total after (ten-year average: 2012 – 2021).

This analysis provides further evidence that Indo-Pacific strategy is imbalanced by a lack of diplomatic investments. With only one exception, every military and economic investment type increased. And these were substantial increases (averaging ~50 percent).


Meanwhile, the general level of diplomatic investments stagnated after the Pivot. And for most types, the level even decreased. Once again, these types include two of the most important ones: Department of State positions and treaties and international agreements.

This stagnation is important because it deprives the U.S. of having sufficient diplomatic means to follow through on its ambitious goals (such as making the region more connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient). It reflects the consequences of deliberate policy choices. For example, while military investments in the Indo-Pacific were protected from budget cuts, diplomatic investments in the region were not. In some cases, they were the first to be on the chopping block.

Graphic 5

Most diplomatic investments in the Indo-Pacific decreased

Almost all military and economic investments increased



The fall in diplomatic investments undermines military and economic efforts

Some of the hardest hit diplomatic investments are intertwined with military and economic efforts. For example, of all the investment types, security and economic agreements decreased the most. Graphics 6 and 7 show these trends in more detail and with a longer timeline. This analysis focuses on trends for bilateral agreements (because it is easier to compare these trends by region). But the trends are similar (if not sharper) for multilateral agreements.

Over the past three decades, the U.S. entered into fewer and fewer treaties and international agreements. After the Pivot, the fall was the sharpest. The fall for economic agreements was even sharper. The Indo-Pacific was not insulated from either fall.

While economic diplomacy slowed, security diplomacy accelerated. After the September 11 attacks, security agreements began to far surpass economic agreements. Despite this rise, the Indo-Pacific did not benefit from the acceleration. Most security agreements were signed in the regions that received more diplomatic attention and resources. Because of this, the Indo-Pacific ranks fourth for new economic and security agreements since the Pivot – despite its primary importance.

These agreements are essential to achieving desired outcomes. For example, the U.S. seeks to maintain an Indo-Pacific that is free and open. Capacity building is one way to achieve this end. This requires more substantive security and economic cooperation in regions (such as Southeast Asia) where U.S. relationships are less advanced. International agreements help lay the foundation for more substantive cooperation. Without these early steps, it is much tougher to achieve the ends of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. And without more diplomatic attention and resources, these early steps will not happen.


The next section focuses on the regional breakdown of U.S. engagement. It provides further evidence for why foundational diplomatic steps are needed to advance broader strategic goals.

Graphic 6


THE FALL OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

The U.S. entered fewer and fewer int'l agreements over the past few decades

The Indo-Pacific also saw this drop




Economic diplomacy fell even sharper
And this happened in the Indo-Pacific



THE LACK OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

Security diplomacy continued to increase

But this was not driven by the Indo-Pacific



4th

The Indo-Pacific experienced the drop in U.S. economic diplomacy, but not much of the rise in U.S. security diplomacy. And other regions continued to receive more diplomatic attention and resources. Because of this, the Indo-Pacific ranks fourth for new economic and security agreements since the Pivot.

	NEW, SINCE PIVOT			TOTAL, IN FORCE		
	Econ	Sec	Both	Econ	Sec	Both
Europe & Russia	+21	+171	+192	526	951	1,477
Americas	+31	+113	+144	534	611	1,145
Africa	+21	+57	+78	398	300	698
Indo-Pacific	+20	+57	+77	286	406	692
Mid. East & Cen. Asia	+8	+40	+48	159	196	355

Regional Engagement

Another way to find imbalances is through the lens of geography. Comparing engagement between regions requires a holistic view because of the varied nature of U.S. relationships. For example, some relationships focus more on military engagement, while others focus more on economic engagement. With the sources I collected, it is possible to get a more holistic view.

To do this, I created an index of U.S. engagement. The index accounts for all ten investment categories. By compiling an array of diplomatic, military, and economic investments into one index, I compared the level of engagement between regions (e.g. Europe & Russia vs. Indo-Pacific) and subregions (e.g. East Asia vs. South Asia).

Graphic 8 provides a breakdown of this *U.S. Engagement Index*. It uses U.S.-Japan engagement in 2009 as an example. This makes it easier to understand how I derived the ‘engagement share’ (to compare entire regions) and ‘engagement score’ (to compare specific countries).

Engagement with the Indo-Pacific remains second to Europe

Despite an increase, the level of engagement in the Indo-Pacific remained second to Europe & Russia. The Americas and Africa remained steady and low. The Middle East & Central Asia dropped the most. The Pivot was preceded by steady growth in Indo-Pacific engagement. After the Pivot, there was a sudden (but temporary) rise. Graphic 9 shows these trends.

Europe & Russia never fell to second place. It benefited from far more diplomatic investments. Direct investments to and from the U.S. further strengthened its primary position. The gap with the Indo-Pacific was the smallest in 2012 and then widened.

Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 was a key factor that diverted attention away from other regions. This analysis does not include 2022 engagement. But there are clear signs that the gap is widening even more after Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine. Closing this gap will require a boost in diplomatic investments to the Indo-Pacific.

Engagement in South Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania remains low

Closing the gap will also require a more distributed approach. The rise in Indo-Pacific engagement is better described as the rise in East Asia engagement. For other Indo-Pacific regions, there was little to no increase in U.S. engagement. This contradicts U.S. intentions over the past decade. Policy statements emphasized the importance of focusing on all regions – including South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. But tangible investments tell a different story. Graphic 9 shows these trends.

There are promising signs that other regions are starting to receive more attention. For example, the expansion of the Quad and the beginning of AUKUS are big moves that could reshape the Indo-Pacific. But most of the potential lies in future cooperation that has yet to be determined. Realizing the promise of the Quad and AUKUS will require tangible investments (such as well-staffed diplomatic teams to carry on the work of high-level leaders). This will make it easier to work through differences to make future agreements.

U.S. ENGAGEMENT INDEX

EXAMPLE: JAPAN IN 2009

DIPLOMATIC APPROPRIATIONS

Share of American diplomatic positions for Japan 2.2%

TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Share of treaties and international agreements entered with Japan 2.0%

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Share of foreign assistance obligations to Japan 0%

LEADER TRAVEL

Share of leader trips to and from Japan 3.9%

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS

Share of congressional hearings about Japan 1.7%

STUDENTS

Share of American students studying abroad in Japan 2.4%

MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS

Share of overseas active-duty troop presence in Japan 14.9%

ARMS SALES

Share of FMS + DCS to Japan 21.1%

DIRECT INVESTMENT

Share of FDI from Japan + USDI to Japan 6.2%

INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Share of exports to Japan + imports from Japan 6.1%

ENGAGEMENT SHARE · average of ten shares (above) **6.15%**

ENGAGEMENT SCORE · scaled engagement score* **48**

The purpose of this index is to track the relative level of U.S. engagement with other regions and countries. It looks at engagement through the lens of different diplomatic, economic, and military investments.


** The 'engagement score' is a scaled version of the 'engagement share'. It takes the highest share over the past two decades (Iraq in 2005) and scales this value to equal 100. All other values are then adjusted, which creates a score from 0 - 100.*

Graphic 9

REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF U.S. ENGAGEMENT*


The Indo-Pacific remains second to Europe

Despite its rise in U.S. resources and attention



U.S. engagement increased in East Asia

But not much in other Indo-Pacific regions



Graphic 10

U.S. ENGAGEMENT INDEX RANKINGS TOP COUNTRIES SINCE THE PIVOT

	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
JAPAN	54	42	45	42	43	37	39	48	55	50	51	63	46	55	47	58	58	59	61
UNITED KINGDOM	53	51	47	48	51	44	42	42	39	38	41	38	41	40	44	37	33	36	40
GERMANY	48	36	37	37	35	36	30	33	28	33	32	28	33	36	34	34	32	37	39
CHINA	25	25	26	29	26	25	29	33	25	35	37	28	32	32	28	34	44	38	33
MEXICO	26	24	25	23	27	26	31	26	27	25	25	21	23	22	20	24	20	24	27
ITALY	24	22	20	21	24	20	20	22	18	18	17	22	22	24	25	23	21	23	25
SOUTH KOREA	29	25	24	24	18	18	21	21	22	23	24	25	23	28	28	23	22	30	24
CANADA	33	31	33	32	36	34	32	29	32	30	30	26	26	23	24	24	25	27	24
ISRAEL	26	21	18	18	18	20	16	14	17	16	14	20	18	18	14	19	14	17	24
AFGHANISTAN	13	13	18	19	22	25	33	52	63	62	58	52	42	31	22	22	30	24	24
SAUDI ARABIA	5	6	6	6	5	8	12	6	5	14	18	10	13	21	17	13	22	21	21
SPAIN	15	16	15	13	12	15	13	12	14	14	12	13	12	15	13	13	14	16	17
NETHERLANDS	14	14	16	13	13	16	14	17	16	15	15	16	15	16	17	17	18	17	16
RUSSIA	15	14	15	17	17	16	14	14	26	14	10	8	12	12	11	14	10	17	16
FRANCE	20	19	17	16	18	17	18	17	17	17	14	16	17	20	18	13	18	16	15
AUSTRALIA	16	13	9	14	15	14	11	15	14	14	12	11	13	11	11	13	12	13	12
BELGIUM	4	6	5	7	6	11	6	7	6	7	7	7	8	8	8	9	13	16	11
SYRIA	2	2	2	2	1	1	3	0	2	4	7	18	6	8	7	8	8	12	11
UAE	3	3	6	2	4	4	4	4	12	6	7	11	4	8	11	7	9	7	10
JORDAN	5	11	6	7	6	9	5	4	5	5	5	12	12	8	9	8	7	5	10
INDIA	13	11	12	14	14	5	14	10	9	11	10	10	11	9	15	10	8	10	10
IRELAND	7	9	8	7	7	6	7	8	7	7	8	8	9	8	10	10	13	11	10
EGYPT	21	11	13	10	9	11	9	10	9	8	11	14	10	8	9	5	8	7	9
IRAN	6	6	6	6	9	7	5	10	7	3	9	9	14	26	12	11	3	7	9
IRAQ	12	54	75	75	72	100	75	46	28	29	15	14	16	12	21	16	9	12	9
SWITZERLAND	8	8	9	7	7	7	8	8	7	7	7	8	9	10	9	9	8	9	7
BRAZIL	5	6	5	7	5	9	7	7	7	8	8	8	5	8	5	4	10	9	6
SINGAPORE	5	5	7	6	11	6	8	10	7	7	5	12	6	10	9	7	8	6	5
TURKEY	13	6	9	10	6	8	8	10	8	7	6	10	6	7	12	11	7	5	4
PAKISTAN	9	8	6	6	6	13	9	12	12	12	10	6	6	12	9	7	8	5	3

Engagement in East Asia is a sign of potential progress

The higher level of U.S. engagement in East Asia is not just a sign of imbalance, but also a sign of potential progress. Despite the Indo-Pacific's secondary importance (based on U.S. engagement), many of the strongest relationships are with Indo-Pacific countries. Graphic 10 shows this dynamic. This is not simply the result of close military ties, but also close diplomatic and economic ties. The U.S.-Japan relationship, in particular, is one of the most extensive relationships.

It is important to draw on the lessons from East Asian engagement. For example, a series of international agreements in East Asia laid the groundwork for more substantive military and economic relationships. The U.S. should seek similar agreements in other Indo-Pacific regions – where there are fewer agreements and less advanced relationships.

As the U.S. expands its engagement in the Indo-Pacific, it is also important to draw on the influence of East Asian countries. For example, South Korea can use its growing influence to play a larger role beyond East Asia.²² But encouraging a larger role and coordinating this role with U.S. goals requires sustained diplomatic investments.

Drawing on lessons and influence from East Asia is a difficult task. But this is needed to expand U.S. engagement to other Indo-Pacific regions. And this will be key to unleashing the potential of the QUAD, expanding AUKUS, and reengaging ASEAN.

The next section applies these findings and focuses on how to fix the imbalances that emerged over the past decade.



STAGE TWO

FIXING IMBALANCES

STAGE TWO: FIXING IMBALANCES

Methods

Next, I focused on what can be done to fix imbalances. To do this, I listened to a wide range of perspectives. First, I reflected on lessons that I have learned from policy experts. Over the past decade, I have been lucky to learn from and work with many talented people (at Boston University, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Harvard Kennedy School). Their expertise has shaped my understanding of foreign policy. And I tried to embed these lessons into this report. Still, these perspectives are familiar to many within the foreign policy community. And alone, they are insufficient. So I tried to offer a different one. To do this, I focused on the American public.

I fielded a nationally representative survey. I designed this survey to answer three questions:

1. How much do Americans value the role of diplomatic, military, and economic power?
2. How much do Americans support increased engagement in the Indo-Pacific?
3. How do American views change based on the information they get about the Indo-Pacific?

This survey is important for two reasons. First, American public opinion impacts the feasibility of options to fix imbalances. It shows what is possible given the limits of American support. Second (and most important), it shows what is needed to support Americans. A sustainable Indo-Pacific strategy must support (and be supported by) the American people. In particular, a Foreign Policy for the Middle Class must tap into the perspectives of the middle class. There is an opportunity to pursue new approaches that are both feasible and favored by Americans. This survey offers a better understanding of how Americans think about the U.S. role in the Indo-Pacific – and thus helps identify new approaches.

Ensuring Survey Quality

To ensure the integrity of responses, I adopted many best practices used by top survey institutions. This included:

- A consent form to ensure that respondents are willing participants
- A small financial incentive to be able to reach a nationally representative sample
- An attention check to ensure that respondents are paying attention
- Question response randomization to prevent order bias
- Simple language and question structure to make the survey interpretable to Americans who may have limited familiarity with U.S. foreign policy
- General foreign policy questions (instead of Indo-Pacific questions) to prevent biased responses towards the Indo-Pacific
- Adopting some questions from Pew Research Center surveys to be able to compare results and gauge consistency
- Collecting a range of demographic information to measure representation and balance

I conducted the survey through a survey organization (used by Harvard University for other research project) that ensures a nationally representative balance (based on age, gender, ethnicity, and region demographics). This process culminated in a survey with over two thousand respondents – and thus provides a unique view into how Americans think about the U.S. role in the Indo-Pacific.

This survey was also conducted during the height of Russia's invasion into Ukraine (February 23 – March 31, 2022). The obvious downside of this timing is that this event influenced responses – making it difficult to extrapolate American views during more peaceful times. But this timing also creates a unique upside. It makes it possible to see how Americans react when conflict arises with a major power. And it makes it possible to see how American views of the Indo-Pacific change when these conflicts arise in other regions.

The next section describes American views, according to the survey results – and excludes “do not know” responses when describing specific questions.

Survey Findings

Americans support more diplomatic engagement

Americans express strong support for diplomacy. 66 percent think that good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace (vs. military strength). 63 percent think that the U.S. should prioritize diplomatic power (vs. military power). 62 percent think that the U.S. should consider the interests of its allies even if it means making compromises with them (vs. following its own national interests even when its allies strongly disagree).

Americans view economic power as a core element of U.S. engagement. 67 percent think that U.S. involvement in the global economy is a good thing because it provides the U.S. with new markets and opportunities for growth (vs. a bad thing because it lowers wages and costs jobs in the U.S.). And 46 percent think that economic power is the most important type of U.S. power (more than the share for either diplomatic or military power).

Despite stronger support for diplomacy, Americans still value the role of military power. For example, 56 percent agree that going to war is unfortunate, but sometimes the only solution to international problems (vs. disagree or neither). And 66 percent have confidence in the Department of Defense to do the right thing in world affairs (more than the share for either the Department of State or the White House, and much more than the share for Congress).

The strongest support for economic and military power emerges within the context of diplomacy. When asked to rank what types of international agreements the U.S. should prioritize, Americans overwhelmingly ranked security and economic agreements higher than other types (3rd: environment, 4th: science & technology, 5th: social issues, and 6th: space). 61 percent ranked security agreements first or second, and 58 percent ranked economic agreements first or second (compared to 33 percent for environment, 21 percent for social issues, 19 percent for science & technology, and 9 percent for space). Americans also favor the U.S. taking a lead on these issues. For example, 92 percent think the U.S. should play a leadership role in the world (23 percent for single leader, 69 percent for shared leadership, and only 8 percent for no leadership).

While Americans express strong support for diplomacy, many are on the fence about increasing investments abroad. Part of this stems from a desire to focus more attention and resources at home. Only 50 percent think it is best for the U.S. to be active in world affairs (vs. paying less attention to problems overseas and concentrating on problems here at home). And when asked whether the U.S. should focus more of its attention and resources on specific regions (Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific), there is a similar split. Another part of this reluctance stems from how Americans perceive the allocation of U.S. attention and resources.

There is a tendency to way overestimate how much the U.S. spends on foreign policy and, in particular, diplomacy. Respondents were asked to estimate how the U.S. currently balances its domestic policy (healthcare, transportation, education, social security, etc.) and foreign policy (diplomacy, military, foreign assistance, etc.) spending. On average, respondents estimate that the U.S. spends 53 percent on domestic policy and 47 percent on foreign policy. Respondents were also asked to estimate how the U.S. currently balances its foreign policy spending (between diplomacy, military, and foreign assistance). On average, respondents estimate that the U.S. spends 27 percent of its foreign policy budget on diplomacy. Over 99 percent overestimate how much the U.S. spends on diplomacy.

Americans are split on Indo-Pacific engagement

Americans are also on the fence about increasing Indo-Pacific engagement. For example, only 45 percent think that the U.S. should focus more of its attention and resources on the Indo-Pacific. Similar to diplomatic investments, this reluctance can be explained by a desire to focus more on domestic affairs and an overestimation of current foreign policy spending. Right now, Europe is also viewed as a higher priority. But much of this reluctance stems from a simple factor: Americans do not hear that much about the Indo-Pacific's importance.

The next section focuses on how American support changes based on the information they get about the Indo-Pacific.

Survey Experiment

Randomized Control Trial

I embedded a randomized control trial within the survey. My goal was to see how American views change when presented with different messages about the Indo-Pacific. One-third of respondents received no prime (i.e. message). The remaining respondents received one of four primes. Half of the primes focused on Asia; the other half focused on China. Half of the primes focused on cooperation; the other half focused on competition. For example, some respondents received the China · competition prime, which suggests that the U.S. will need to compete more with China. Graphic 11 provides a more detailed breakdown. All respondents were randomly assigned, which made it possible to measure the causal impact of receiving different messages.

Result: focusing on the need to cooperate in Asia causes a larger increase in support for Indo-Pacific engagement

The China · competition prime does not cause the largest increase in support for Indo-Pacific engagement. This is important because, over the past few years, the main message that Americans received was that the U.S. needs to compete more with China. It does cause more Americans to view the Indo-Pacific as important. And it appears to mobilize support for investments at home. But compared to other primes, it does not mobilize as much support for investments in the Indo-Pacific.

The Asia · cooperation prime causes a larger increase in support for Indo-Pacific engagement. This is important because a core message of the new Indo-Pacific strategy is that the U.S. needs to cooperate more in the Indo-Pacific. But most Americans do not read government strategy documents. Until this message is communicated directly to the American people, latent support for Indo-Pacific engagement will go untapped.

Graphic 12 shows detailed survey experiment results. Because of the large survey size, these results have a high level of statistical significance. Almost all results are significant at the 99 percent level (meaning that, for each result, there is a less than one percent chance that the result is due to sampling fluctuations).

These results also provide further evidence that Americans favor sending diplomatic investments abroad (over military ones). First, there is a stronger baseline of support. A higher share think that the U.S. should send more of its diplomats to the Indo-Pacific (than its military). Second, there is more latent potential for increasing this support. Three primes caused a double-digit increase in the share who support sending more diplomats. All primes caused a clear majority. The results for sending more of the military are smaller and less conclusive.

These results reinforce the need for more public outreach about the region. Without it, Americans will be split over the idea of investing more in the Indo-Pacific. With it, there could be a decisive majority that support increased investments.

The next section applies these findings and presents recommendations to fix imbalances.

SURVEY EXPERIMENT PRIMES

RANDOMIZED CONTROL TRIAL*



- 1** Over the past few decades, Asian economies have grown very fast. This growth has lifted millions out of poverty and created new opportunities. According to many, **the U.S. will need to cooperate more in Asia (Indo-Pacific)** to make progress.
- 2** Over the past few decades, Asian economies have grown very fast. This growth has increased military spending and created new challenges. According to many, **the U.S. will need to compete more in Asia (Indo-Pacific)** to solve problems.
- 3** Over the past few decades, China's economy has grown very fast. This growth has lifted millions out of poverty and created new opportunities. According to many, **the U.S. will need to cooperate more with China** to make progress.
- 4** Over the past few decades, China's economy has grown very fast. This growth has increased military spending and created new challenges. According to many, **the U.S. will need to compete more with China** to solve problems.

*SOME RESPONDENTS RECEIVED PRIMES. THIS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO SEE HOW RECEIVING DIFFERENT MESSAGES ABOUT THE INDO-PACIFIC CHANGES AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS.


Graphic 12

MAIN SURVEY EXPERIMENT RESULTS

● CONTROL ● TREATMENT


0 20 40 60 80 100%

22% of Americans think the Indo-Pacific will have the biggest impact on world affairs in the 21st century



Percentage point
increase caused
by prime


45% of Americans think the U.S. should focus more its resources and attention on the Indo-Pacific
The Asia primes caused a much larger increase in willingness to invest more in the region



46% of Americans think the U.S. should send more of its diplomats to the Indo-Pacific
The Asia primes increased support (the most) for sending more diplomats



34% of Americans think the U.S. should send more of its military to the Indo-Pacific
The competition primes increased support for sending more of the military



> Majority

*** +99% statistical significance | ** +95% | * +90%

n = 2,276 respondents

Main Recommendation

Increase the share of Indo-Pacific diplomatic positions to 30 percent

A balanced Indo-Pacific strategy demands more diplomatic investments. And of all the investment types, diplomatic positions were hit the hardest over the past decade. Graphic 13 shows these trends. After the Pivot, all regions saw cuts. But the Indo-Pacific saw the biggest cuts. The past two budget requests (for FY21 and FY22) included small increases. But the Indo-Pacific still ranks third (behind Europe & Russia and the Middle East & Central Asia). This tertiary status contradicts policy statements and amplifies the main imbalance of Indo-Pacific strategy.

Benefits: This move would revitalize a key area of U.S. diplomacy that was cut the most. Increasing the share of diplomatic positions to 30 percent would make the Indo-Pacific the primary theater for the Department of State. This would demonstrate that the U.S. shift is more than a military one. It would carry all of the traditional benefits that come with strong diplomacy (expanding the U.S. ability to manage tensions, address transnational challenges, and strengthen partnerships).

It would also support military and economic efforts. For example, compared to East Asia, many relationships in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania are less advanced. These regions require even more diplomatic attention to lay the foundation for more substantive military and economic engagement. It would also provide more resilience. When crises divert high-level attention away from the Indo-Pacific, lower-level diplomacy would be in a stronger position to sustain American efforts.

Navy case study: The Navy offers an example for the benefits of this approach. In 2012, Secretary Panetta announced the decision to shift 60 percent of the U.S. fleet to the Pacific.²³ This drove a major reorientation in the allocation of naval investments. It also led the way for more military shifts. A year later, then-Deputy Secretary Carter announced further shifts for other military investments.²⁴

This type of approach is more impactful because it calls for an organization-wide reorientation. It bolsters means – which signals to allies and partners that U.S. intentions will be backed by sufficient resources. And it can insulate key investments from future uncertainty. The Navy's shift happened during a time of extreme budget uncertainty. Protecting the Pacific fleet from future cuts was a central goal. This approach protected these investments from potential cuts.

My recommendation models the Navy's approach. It seeks an increase to only 30 percent (half of the Navy's share). This would be enough to make the Indo-Pacific the top area for diplomatic expertise. And this shift would cost a small fraction of the Navy's shift.

Costs: Increasing the share of diplomatic positions requires either 1) a topline budget increase or 2) cuts to other parts of the State Department. Given the recent cuts to Department of State funding, this approach should be funded with a topline budget increase. Department of State morale hit a low point over the past few years. Further cuts to other programs would further damage workplace morale. There is also growing recognition that the U.S. will need to deploy more resources to deal with China and Russia. The White House should tap into this willingness by further increasing diplomatic spending.

Relative to other investments in the Indo-Pacific, funding this approach would be inexpensive. Most Indo-Pacific positions are within the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP). Even a huge increase to EAP would be a drop in the bucket by military standards. For example, a 50 percent increase in the EAP annual budget would cost under \$150 million. By comparison, the unit cost for a single F-35 (before any sustainment costs) is \$151 million.²⁵ By this spring, there will be 54 new F-35s in Alaska – with even more being deployed to the Indo-Pacific in the coming years.²⁶ The U.S. can afford to increase the share of diplomatic positions to 30 percent.

Process: The White House should pursue this increase in the FY24 and FY25 budget requests. In addition to this basic step, it is essential to have a stronger outreach strategy. Increasing the share of Indo-Pacific diplomatic positions demands more Congressional and public awareness. This increase could be part of a broader effort to mobilize support for resourcing the new Indo-Pacific strategy.

With Congress, the White House should continue to emphasize the need to compete with China. This is a rare, unifying motivator for Congress. The recent passage of the China COMPETE Act by the House demonstrates this bipartisan motivation.²⁷ The White House should tap into this motivation by making the case that more diplomatic investments are needed to better compete with China.

Raising public awareness about the Indo-Pacific will also spur Congressional action. To begin with, there is strong, underlying support for deepening U.S. diplomatic engagement. The U.S. government should pay closer attention to these views.

There is also an opportunity to mobilize public support for more concrete investments in the Indo-Pacific. But this requires careful and sustained public messaging. The outreach strategy should emphasize two core elements:

1. Because of the region's growing importance, the U.S. will need to cooperate more with Indo-Pacific countries. This is needed to address the challenges of climate change and to unleash the economic potential of new growth. This will help the American middle class. Diplomatic investments are key to making this happen.

A message that focuses on the need to cooperate in the Indo-Pacific causes a large increase in American support for more investments. And this message is already embedded in the new Indo-Pacific strategy.

2. Relative to ongoing investments, diplomatic investments are inexpensive and will remain inexpensive.


Given that Americans overestimate the cost of diplomatic spending (and foreign policy spending overall), it is important to emphasize the low costs. This will make Americans more willing to support concrete investments.

Most of all, the American public simply needs to hear more about the Indo-Pacific. Given the region's primary importance to the U.S., there have been too few statements and speeches about the Indo-Pacific. With heightened public awareness, it will be easier to spur Congressional action.

THE FALL OF DIPLOMATIC POSITIONS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC

After the Pivot, diplomatic positions fell

This fall was very sharp for the Indo-Pacific



CHANGE IN TOTAL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSITIONS SINCE 2011
ACTUAL: 2011 - 2019; ESTIMATE: 2020

The Indo-Pacific remains in third

And remains far behind Europe

	BEFORE THE PIVOT		TEN YEARS AFTER	
	FY2011, actual	FY2021, request	FY2021, actual	FY2021, request
Europe & Russia	1,820	26%	1,538	27%
Mid. East & Cen. Asia	1,539	22%	1,124	20%
Indo-Pacific	1,376	19%	1,074	19%
Africa	1,156	16%	988	17%
Americas	1,175	17%	962	17%

TOTAL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POSITIONS
INCLUDES REGIONAL BUREAUS AND
EXCLUDES POSITIONS THAT CUT ACROSS REGIONS

U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy after Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is having a major impact on the Indo-Pacific. Most of its consequences are still unclear and unfolding. It is clear that more U.S. attention and resources will focus on Europe. This is important for both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. It shows that the U.S. is capable and willing to act against aggression. And it shows the value of an American presence. But it also raises an important question over whether this should reduce investments in the Indo-Pacific.

Some argue that the U.S. should slow its shift to the Indo-Pacific to better balance investments between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The underlying logic of this argument is flawed. This perspective implies that the balance is already (or soon-to-be) in favor of the Indo-Pacific. But this is not the case. My research shows that U.S. engagement remains higher in Europe.

In particular, far more diplomatic investments go to Europe. And there is no sign that this will change anytime soon. There is widespread agreement that the Indo-Pacific should be the primary theater. But it is still a secondary theater for U.S. engagement. So increased diplomatic investments in Europe should not undercut investments in the Indo-Pacific.

Instead, Russia's invasion reinforces the need to increase diplomatic investments in the Indo-Pacific. It offers two main lessons. First, it shows the inherent risk of military expansion. This risk needs to be managed – and diplomacy helps do this.

NATO expansion is a contentious topic. But it is undeniable that Russia views NATO expansion as a threat to its security. This does not justify Russia's illegal invasion, but it is a contributing factor. China has a similar view of U.S. military moves in the Indo-Pacific. And compared to Russia in the 1990s and 2000s, China is in a much stronger position to respond. Some tensions are inevitable. But an overmilitarized approach risks inflaming these tensions.

Over the past decade, policy statements signaled that the U.S. would shift its diplomatic, economic, and military investments to the entire Indo-Pacific. Instead, the shift was mostly a military one to East Asia. This discrepancy makes U.S. intentions seem more aggressive to China.

A major increase in diplomatic investments across the Indo-Pacific will make U.S. intentions seem less aggressive. A more balanced approach could show that the U.S. has a positive vision for the region (and not a containment strategy against China). More diplomatic attention and resources would also help to work through differences with China. This could reduce the size of military buildups and risk of miscalculations.

Second, Russia's invasion shows the need for strong relationships and institutions. No amount of diplomacy can eliminate the risk of conflict with China. But it can strengthen the response to conflict. The West's rapid and resolute response to Russia's invasion shows the value of having diplomatic investments in-place. U.S.-European relationships have benefited from more attention and resources. This enabled a swift reaction – which is key to deterring future aggression. This same level of attention and resources is needed in the Indo-Pacific, where the long-term stakes are higher.

Supporting Recommendations

Increase the level of travel to and from the Indo-Pacific · Start by inviting more Indo-Pacific leaders to the U.S.

Unlike with diplomatic positions, there was a clear uptick in U.S. leader trips to the Indo-Pacific after the Pivot. Trips by the Secretary of Defense increased the most, followed by the Secretary of State, and then the President. But the share of travel to and from the Indo-Pacific remains quite low (relative to all regions).

Leader travel is one of the more cross-cutting investment types. For example, some trips to Europe focus on coordinating efforts in the Indo-Pacific. But trips to and from the Indo-Pacific are the most consequential in shaping Indo-Pacific strategy. And the positive spillovers work both ways. For example, discussions with Indo-Pacific leaders can focus on coordinating efforts in Europe. While this direction of positive spillover has not received as much attention, it should receive more following Russia's invasion.

Leader travel is also one of the most finite investment types. So increasing Indo-Pacific travel is difficult. But a good place to start is to invite Indo-Pacific leaders to visit the U.S. more often. The cost of such trips is lower than the expensive undertaking of presidential travel. And while the share of trips to the Indo-Pacific is low, the share of trips from the region is even lower. Over the past decade, European leaders visited the U.S. more than twice as much as Indo-Pacific leaders. The White House can show more respect and commitment to the Indo-Pacific simply by extending more invitations to Indo-Pacific leaders.

Incentivize more American students to study abroad in the Indo-Pacific by building on existing programs

The story of young Americans studying abroad is similar to U.S. leader travel. After the Pivot, there was a rise in the number of Americans who studied in the region. But there was a rise in most regions. And the share of Americans who studied in the Indo-Pacific remained about the same. Today, the vast majority still study in Europe (conversely, the vast majority of foreign students in the U.S. are from the Indo-Pacific).

Having a larger share of Americans study in the Indo-Pacific would support U.S. foreign policy goals. It would strengthen regional ties. And for many students, it would spark an interest in pursuing an Indo-Pacific-related career. A successful Indo-Pacific strategy rests on both: strong regional ties and regional expertise.

The cost to incentivize students is quite low. Even partial scholarships can be the decisive factor. Scholarships also tap into America's competitive advantage: its diverse population. In particular, U.S. diplomacy would benefit from having more diversity in the diplomatic corps. But too few minority students have access to study abroad opportunities – which are often a steppingstone to a diplomatic career. Indo-Pacific scholarships would help change this.

Scholarship programs can also have an outsized impact because of network effects. If a few students get funding to study abroad, then their classmates will hear about their trip and become more inclined to study in the same country (even without funding support). Europe showcases this network effect. Despite being an expensive place to travel, it draws more and more students each year. The top destinations for Americans just keep getting bigger. The best way to build network effects in the Indo-Pacific at a low cost is to expand existing efforts. If needed, funding could also be shifted away from other regions (that already attract a lot of American students).

The Obama administration took some promising steps. My story was shaped by these steps. In 2010, Secretary Clinton launched the “100K Strong” program, an effort to diversify and increase the number of students who study in China. A year later, I moved to Shanghai to study at Fudan University. I was inspired to do this because of the sudden surge in interest and opportunities to study in China. This experience sparked my desire to pursue a foreign policy career. Without this experience, I would not be writing this report. Similar efforts could include the entire Indo-Pacific (in particular, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania).

Create a stronger feedback loop for diplomatic, military, and economic engagement · Begin by creating a simple tool to track investments.

I intended to focus my final recommendation on treaties and international agreements. Given the region's importance, there is a shocking lack of security and economic agreements in the Indo-Pacific. There is strong support in Washington to increase engagement in the Indo-Pacific. And there is strong support among Americans to prioritize economic and security agreements. Given these two factors, it is both essential and possible to enter into more agreements with Indo-Pacific countries. These agreements would lay the foundation for more substantive engagement in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Oceania.

So why, despite strong support, did the U.S. not focus more attention and resources on pursuing more security and economic agreements in the Indo-Pacific? There are a number of reasons for the lack of progress. But after a year of research, one stands out: key trends in U.S. diplomatic, military, and economic engagement remain hidden.

For all of the time that policymakers and analysts spend emersed in the details of government, there are underlying currents of U.S. power that go unnoticed. This is not the fault of busy people with important jobs. It is because key trends are impossible to see without piecing together massive amounts of disparate government information. If these trends become more visible and better known, there should be a stronger drive to pursue more agreements.

There is growing recognition about the need to better use data to manage organizations – including within the U.S. government. Both the Department of State and the Department of Defense released new data strategies.³⁰ A major goal of these strategies is to use data to shine a light on internal practices – in a way that empowers leaders to make better decisions. But despite this growing recognition, the way that the U.S. government stores and shares information on foreign policy investments remains outdated. This can be changed.

Any major business worth its salt has a customer relationship management (CRM) tool – which makes it possible to track relationships and interactions with customers. The U.S. government should have a similar tool – which makes it possible to track relationships, interactions, and investments with countries. This tool should draw on a wide array of data sources (including sources from the Department of State and the Department of Defense). It could expand on the sources that I collected (such as tracking all diplomatic meetings and military exercises).

This does not have to begin as a major endeavor. My work shows what is possible at a low cost. The key challenge is to bridge sources together with standard codes. While this is no small task, it is still feasible. A small team (or even an individual) could be responsible for creating an initial tool.

Having an integrated view of foreign policy investments would create a stronger feedback loop to track U.S. engagement. It would enable leaders across the government to answer central questions with more clarity. Is the Indo-Pacific receiving sufficient diplomatic, military, and economic attention? Does the U.S. have sufficient resources to achieve the goals of its new strategy? Based on these answers, future investments could be better calibrated to meet strategic needs.

A boost in diplomatic investments would have a transformative impact on U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. But until there is a clearer view of foreign policy investments, it will be impossible to tap into the full potential of American statecraft.

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APPENDIX

This appendix includes supporting information. It is split into two parts:

- Stage One: Finding Imbalances
- Stage Two: Fixing Imbalances

Stage One

This stage involved the combination of many sources. The main focus was to collect comprehensive data between 2002 and 2021. This year range covers the ten years before the Pivot and the ten years after the Pivot. For some sources, specific years are unavailable. The following list shows this availability, by source.

For every year that is available, the information is comprehensive – which means that it covers all countries (Afghanistan to Zimbabwe).

- Diplomatic appropriations: 2006 – 2015, 2017 - 2021
- Treaties and international agreements: 2002 – 2020
- Foreign assistance: 2002 – 2020
- Leader travel: 2002 – 2020
- Congressional hearings: 2005 – 2021
- Students abroad: 2002 – 2020
- Military deployments: *troops*, 2002 – 2020; *ships and aircraft*, 2002 – 2021
- Arms sales: 2002 – 2010, 2012 – 2019
- Direct investment: 2002 – 2020
- International trade: 2002 – 2019

Bridging these sources required codes. The subsequent pages show the codes for: regions and countries, diplomatic appropriations, treaties and international agreements, and military deployments.

Stage Two

This stage involved a major survey. The second part of the appendix shows the survey questions.

Treaty and international agreement codes

Main Category	Category	Department of State Classification
Economic	Economics & Transportation	Agriculture Finance Intellectual Property Postal Matters Trade & Investment Transportation
Security	Defense & Security	Arms Control Defense International Criminal Court Law Enforcement Nonproliferation Occupation & Peacekeeping Peace Rules Of War Weapons
Other	Consular Issues and Foreign Support	Civil Affairs, Emergencies & Def. Cultural Exchanges, Property & C. Diplomatic & Consular Affairs Diplomatic & Consular Relations Foreign Assistance Treaty Law UN & Related Organizations
	Environment	Environment & Conservation Pollution
	Maritime	Antarctica & Arctic Canals Fisheries Maritime Matters
	Nuclear Energy	Nuclear Energy
	Science & Technology	Energy Scientific & Technical Cooperation Telecommunication
	Social Issues & Taxes	Education Employment Health & Medical Cooperation Labor Migration & Refugees Private International Law Social Security Taxation
	Space	Space Space Cooperation
	Territorial Issues & Disputes	Boundaries & Boundary Waters Claims & Dispute Resolution Property Regional Issues Territorial Issues

Region and country codes

Region	Codes	Country	Region	Codes	Country
Indo-Pacific	AUS	Australia	Africa	ERI	Eritrea
	BGD	Bangladesh		ESH	Western Sahara
	BRN	Brunei Darussalam		ETH	Ethiopia
Indo-Pacific	BTN	Bhutan		GAB	Gabon
	CHN	China		GHA	Ghana
	COK	Cook Islands (the)		GIN	Guinea
	FJI	Fiji		GMB	Gambia (the)
	FSM	Micronesia (Federated States of)		GNB	Guinea-Bissau
	IDN	Indonesia		GNQ	Equatorial Guinea
	IND	India		KEN	Kenya
	JPN	Japan		LBR	Liberia
	KHM	Cambodia		LBY	Libya
	KIR	Kiribati		LSO	Lesotho
	KOR	Korea (the Republic of)		MAR	Morocco
	LAO	Lao People's Democratic Republic (the)		MDG	Madagascar
	LKA	Sri Lanka		MLI	Mali
	MDV	Maldives		MOZ	Mozambique
	MHL	Marshall Islands (the)		MRT	Mauritania
	MMR	Myanmar		MUS	Mauritius
	MNG	Mongolia		MWI	Malawi
	MYS	Malaysia		NAM	Namibia
	NCL	New Caledonia		NER	Niger (the)
	NIU	Niue		NGA	Nigeria
	NPL	Nepal		RWA	Rwanda
	NRU	Nauru		SEN	Senegal
Indo-Pacific	NZL	New Zealand		SLE	Sierra Leone
	PHL	Philippines (the)		SOM	Somalia
	PLW	Palau		SSD	South Sudan
	PNG	Papua New Guinea		STP	Sao Tome and Principe
	PRK	Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of)		SWZ	Eswatini
	SGP	Singapore		SYC	Seychelles
	SLB	Solomon Islands		TCD	Chad
	THA	Thailand		TGO	Togo
	TLS	Timor-Leste		TUN	Tunisia
	TON	Tonga		TZA	Tanzania, United Republic of
	TUV	Tuvalu		UGA	Uganda
	TWN	Taiwan		ZMB	Zambia
	VNM	Viet Nam		ZWE	Zimbabwe
	VUT	Vanuatu	Americas	ABW	Aruba
	WSM	Samoa		AIA	Anguilla
Africa	AGO	Angola		ARG	Argentina
	BDI	Burundi		ATG	Antigua and Barbuda
	BEN	Benin		BHS	Bahamas (the)
	BFA	Burkina Faso		BLZ	Belize
	BWA	Botswana		BMU	Bermuda
	CAF	Central African Republic (the)		BOL	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
	CIV	Côte d'Ivoire		BRA	Brazil
	CMR	Cameroon		BRB	Barbados
	COD	Congo (the Democratic Republic of the)		CAN	Canada
	COG	Congo (the)		CHL	Chile
	COM	Comoros (the)		COL	Colombia
	CPV	Cabo Verde		CRI	Costa Rica
	DJI	Djibouti		CUB	Cuba
	DZA	Algeria		CUW	Curaçao

Region and country codes

Region	Codes	Country	Region	Codes	Country
Americas	CYM	Cayman Islands (the)	Europe & Russia	LTU	Lithuania
	DMA	Dominica		LUX	Luxembourg
	DOM	Dominican Republic (the)		LVA	Latvia
	ECU	Ecuador		MCO	Monaco
	GRD	Grenada		MDA	Moldova (the Republic of)
	GTM	Guatemala		MKD	Republic of North Macedonia
	GUY	Guyana		MLT	Malta
	HND	Honduras		MNE	Montenegro
	HTI	Haiti		NLD	Netherlands (the)
	JAM	Jamaica		NOR	Norway
	TKN	Saint Kitts and Nevis		POL	Poland
	LCA	Saint Lucia		PRT	Portugal
	MEX	Mexico		ROU	Romania
	MSR	Montserrat		RUS	Russian Federation (the)
	MTQ	Martinique		SMR	San Marino
	NIC	Nicaragua		SRB	Serbia
	PAN	Panama		SVK	Slovakia
	PER	Peru		SVN	Slovenia
	PRY	Paraguay		SWE	Sweden
	SLV	El Salvador		TUR	Turkey
	SUR	Suriname		UKR	Ukraine
	TCA	Turks and Caicos Islands (the)		VAT	Holy See (the)
	TTO	Trinidad and Tobago	Middle East & Central Asia	AFG	Afghanistan
	URY	Uruguay		ARE	United Arab Emirates (the)
	VCT	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		BHR	Bahrain
	VEN	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)		CYP	Cyprus
Europe & Russia	ALB	Albania		EGY	Egypt
	AND	Andorra		IRN	Iran (Islamic Republic of)
	ARM	Armenia		IRQ	Iraq
	AUT	Austria		ISR	Israel
	AZE	Azerbaijan		JOR	Jordan
	BEL	Belgium		KAZ	Kazakhstan
	BGR	Bulgaria		KGZ	Kyrgyzstan
	BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina		KWT	Kuwait
	BLR	Belarus		LBN	Lebanon
	CHE	Switzerland		OMN	Oman
	CZE	Czechia		PAK	Pakistan
	DEU	Germany		PSE	Palestine, State of
	DNK	Denmark		QAT	Qatar
	ESP	Spain		SAU	Saudi Arabia
	EST	Estonia		SYR	Syrian Arab Republic
	FIN	Finland		TJK	Tajikistan
	FRA	France		TKM	Turkmenistan
	GBR	United Kingdom of Great Britain and North. Ire.		UZB	Uzbekistan
	GEO	Georgia		YEM	Yemen
	GIB	Gibraltar			
	GRC	Greece			
	GRL	Greenland			
	HRV	Croatia			
	HUN	Hungary			
	IRL	Ireland			
	ISL	Iceland			
	ITA	Italy			
	LIE	Liechtenstein			

Diplomatic appropriation codes

Country	Country Code	New Office	Country	Country Code	New Office
Afghanistan	AFG	Afghan Coordinator's Office	Botswana	BWA	Botswana, Gaborone
		Afghan Reconstruction Affairs Office			Brazil, Belo Horizonte
		Afghanistan Interagency Operation Group			Brazil, Brasilia
		Afghanistan, Kabul			Brazil, Porto Alegre
		Office of Afghanistan Affairs			Brazil, Recife
Albania	ALB	Albania, Tirana	Brazil	BRA	Brazil, Rio de Janeiro
Algeria	DZA	Algeria, Algiers			Brazil, Sao Paulo
Angola	AGO	Angola, Luanda			Brunei Darussalam, Brunei, Bandar Seri Begawan
Argentina	ARG	Argentina, Buenos Aires	Bulgaria	BGR	Bulgaria, Sofia
Armenia	ARM	Armenia, Yerevan	Burkina Faso	BFA	Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou
Australia	AUS	Australia, Canberra	Burundi	BDI	Burundi, Bujumbura
		Australia, Melbourne	Cabo Verde	CPV	Cabo Verde, Praia
		Australia, Perth			Cape Verde, Praia
		Australia, Sydney	Cambodia	KHM	Cambodia, Phnom Penh
		Melbourne, Australia	Cameroon	CMR	Cameroon, Yaounde
Austria	AUT	Austria, Vienna	Canada	CAN	Canada, Calgary
Azerbaijan	AZE	Azerbaijan, Baku			Canada, Halifax
Bahamas (the)	BHS	Bahamas, Nassau			Canada, Montreal
Bahrain	BHR	Bahrain, Manama			Canada, Ottawa
Bangladesh	BGD	Bangladesh, Dhaka			Canada, Quebec
Barbados	BRB	Barbados, Bridgetown			Canada, Toronto
Belarus	BLR	Belarus, Minsk			Canada, Vancouver
Belgium	BEL	Belgium, Brussels			Canada, Winnipeg
Belize	BLZ	Belize, Belize City			Office of Canadian Affairs
		Belize, Belmopan	Central African Republic (the)	CAF	Central Afr Rep., Bangui
Benin	BEN	Benin, Cotonou	Chad	TCD	Chad, N'Djamena
Bermuda	BMU	Bermuda, Hamilton	Chile	CHL	Chile, Santiago
Bolivia (Plurinational ..)	BOL	Bolivia, La Paz	China	CHN	China, Beijing
Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo			China, Chengdu

Diplomatic appropriation codes

Country	Country Code	New Office	Country	Country Code	New Office
China	CHN	China, Guangzhou	Eswatini	SWZ	Swaziland, Mbabane
		China, Hong Kong	Ethiopia	ETH	Ethiopia, Addis Ababa
		China, Lhasa	Fiji	FJI	Fiji, Suva
		China, Nanjing	Finland	FIN	Finland, Helsinki
		China, Shanghai	France	FRA	France, Bordeaux
		China, Shenyang			France, Lille
		China, Wuhan			France, Lyon
		China, Xiamen			France, Marseille
		Office of Chinese Affairs			France, Paris
Colombia	COL	Colombia, Bogota			France, Rennes
Congo (the Democratic R..	COD	Dem. Rep of Congo, Kinshasa			France, Strasbourg
Congo (the)	COG	Rep. Of the Congo, Brazzaville			France, Toulouse
Costa Rica	CRI	Costa Rica, San Jose	Gabon	GAB	Gabon, Libreville
Côte d'Ivoire	CIV	Cote d'Ivoire, Abidjan	Gambia (the)	GMB	Gambia, Banjul
Croatia	HRV	Croatia, Zagreb	Georgia	GEO	Georgia, Tbilisi
Cuba	CUB	Office of Cuban Affairs	Germany	DEU	Germany, Berlin
Cyprus	CYP	Cyprus, Nicosia			Germany, Dusseldorf
Czechia	CZE	Czech Republic, Prague			Germany, Frankfurt
Denmark	DNK	Denmark, Copenhagen			Germany, Hamburg
Djibouti	DJI	Djibouti (Rep. Of), Djibouti			Germany, Leipzig
Dominican Republic (the)	DOM	Dom. Republic, Santo Domingo			Germany, Munich
Ecuador	ECU	Ecuador, Guayaquil	Ghana	GHA	Ghana, Accra
		Ecuador, Quito	Greece	GRC	Greece, Athens
Egypt	EGY	Egypt, Cairo			Greece, Thessaloniki
El Salvador	SLV	El Salvador, San Salvador	Grenada	GRD	Grenada, St. Georges
Equatorial Guinea	GNQ	Equatorial Guinea, Malabo	Guatemala	GTM	Guatemala, Guatemala City
Eritrea	ERI	Eritrea, Asmara	Guinea	GIN	Guinea, Conakry
Estonia	EST	Estonia, Tallinn	Guinea-Bissau	GNB	Guinea-Bissau, Bissau
Eswatini	SWZ	Eswatini, Mbabane	Guyana	GUY	Guyana, Georgetown

Diplomatic appropriation codes

Country	Country Code	New Office	Country	Country Code	New Office
Haiti	HTI	Haiti Special Coordinator's Office Haiti, Port-au-Prince Office of Haitian Affairs WHA/Haiti	Japan	JPN	Japan, Fukuoka Japan, Nagoya Japan, Naha Japan, Osaka-Kobe
Holy See (the)	VAT	Holy See, Vatican City Vatican City, Holy See			Japan, Sapporo Japan, Tokyo
Honduras	HND	Honduras, Tegucigalpa			Office of Japan
Hungary	HUN	Hungary, Budapest	Jordan	JOR	Jordan, Amman
Iceland	ISL	Iceland, Reykjavik	Kazakhstan	KAZ	Kazakhstan, Almaty Kazakhstan, Astana
India	IND	India, Chennai (CG)	Kenya	KEN	Kenya, Nairobi
		India, Hyderabad	Korea (the Republic of)	KOR	Office of Korea South Korea, Busan
		India, Kolkata (CG)			South Korea, Seoul
		India, Mumbai (CG)			
		India, New Delhi			
		Office of India Affairs	Kosovo	KOS	Kosovo, Pristina
Indonesia	IDN	Indonesia, Jakarta	Kuwait	KWT	Kuwait, Kuwait
		Indonesia, Medan	Kyrgyzstan	KGZ	Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek
		Indonesia, Surabaya	Lao People's Democratic R..	LAO	Laos, Vientiane
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	IRN	Office of Iranian Affairs	Latvia	LVA	Latvia, Riga
Iraq	IRQ	Iraq, Baghdad	Lebanon	LBN	Lebanon, Beirut
		Office of Iraq Affairs	Lesotho	LSO	Lesotho, Maseru
Ireland	IRL	Ireland, Dublin	Liberia	LBR	Liberia, Monrovia
Israel	ISR	Israel, Jerusalem	Libya	LBY	Libya, Tripoli
		Israel, Tel Aviv	Lithuania	LTU	Lithuania, Vilnius
Italy	ITA	Italy, Florence	Luxembourg	LUX	Luxembourg, Luxembourg
		Italy, Milan	Madagascar	MDG	Madagascar, Antananarivo
		Italy, Naples	Malawi	MWI	Malawi, Lilongwe
		Italy, Rome	Malaysia	MYS	Malaysia, Kota Kinabalu Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur
Jamaica	JAM	Jamaica, Kingston			

Diplomatic appropriation codes

Country	Country Code	New Office	Country	Country Code	New Office
Mali	MLI	Mali, Bamako	New Zealand	NZL	New Zealand, Auckland
Malta	MLT	Malta, Valletta			New Zealand, Wellington
Marshall Islands (the)	MHL	Marshall Islands, Majuro	Nicaragua	NIC	Nicaragua, Managua
Mauritania	MRT	Mauritania, Nouakchott	Niger (the)	NER	Niger, Niamey
Mauritius	MUS	Mauritius, Port Louis	Nigeria	NGA	Nigeria, Abuja
Mexico	MEX	Mexico, Ciudad Juarez			Nigeria, Lagos
		Mexico, Guadalajara	Norway	NOR	Norway, Oslo
		Mexico, Hermosillo	Oman	OMN	Oman, Muscat
		Mexico, Matamoros	Pakistan	PAK	Office of Pakistan Affairs
		Mexico, Merida			Pakistan, Islamabad
		Mexico, Mexico City			Pakistan, Karachi (CG)
		Mexico, Monterrey			Pakistan, Lahore (CG)
		Mexico, Nogales			Pakistan, Peshawar (CN)
		Mexico, Nuevo Laredo	Palau	PLW	Palau, Koror
		Mexico, Tijuana	Panama	PAN	Panama, Panama City
		Office of Mexican Affairs	Papua New Guinea	PNG	Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby
Micronesia (Federated St..)	FSM	Federated St. of Micronesia, Kolonia	Paraguay	PRY	Paraguay, Asuncion
Moldova (the Republic of)	MDA	Moldova, Chisinau	Peru	PER	Peru, Lima
Mongolia	MNG	Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar	Philippines (the)	PHL	Philippines, Manila
Montenegro	MNE	Montenegro, Podgorica	Poland	POL	Poland, Krakow
Morocco	MAR	Casablanca			Poland, Warsaw
		Morocco, Rabat	Portugal	PRT	Ponta Delgada
Mozambique	MOZ	Mozambique, Maputo			Portugal, Lisbon
Myanmar	MMR	Burma, Rangoon	Qatar	QAT	Qatar, Doha
Namibia	NAM	Namibia, Windhoek	Republic of North Maced..	MKD	Macedonia, Skopje
Nepal	NPL	Nepal, Kathmandu	Romania	ROU	Cluj-Napoca
Netherlands (the)	ANT	Netherlands Antilles, Curacao			Romania, Bucharest
	NLD	Netherlands, Amsterdam			Romania, Cluj-Napoca
		Netherlands, The Hague	Russian Federation	RUS	Office of Russian Affairs

Diplomatic appropriation codes

Country	Country Code	New Office	Country	Country Code	New Office
Russian Federation (the)	RUS	Russia, Moscow	Switzerland	CHE	Switzerland, Bern
		Russia, St Petersburg	Syrian Arab Republic	SYR	Syria, Damascus
		Russia, Vladivostok	Tajikistan	TJK	Tajikistan, Dushanbe
		Russia, Yekaterinburg	Tanzania, United Repub..	TZA	Tanzania, Dar-es-Salaam
Rwanda	RWA	Rwanda, Kigali	Thailand	THA	Thailand, Bangkok
Samoa	WSM	Western Samoa, Apia			Thailand, Chiang Mai
Saudi Arabia	SAU	Dhahran	Timor-Leste	TLS	Timor-Leste, Dili
		Jeddah	Togo	TGO	Togo, Lome
		Saudi Arabia, Riyadh	Trinidad and Tobago	TTO	Trinidad, Port-au- Spain
Senegal	SEN	Senegal, Dakar	Tunisia	TUN	Tunisia, Tunis
Serbia	SRB	Serbia, Belgrade	Turkey	TUR	Turkey, Adana
Seychelles	SYC	Seychelles, Victoria			Turkey, Ankara
Sierra Leone	SLE	Sierra Leone, Freetown			Turkey, Istanbul
Singapore	SGP	Singapore, Singapore			Turkey, Izmir
Slovakia	SVK	Slovakia, Bratislava	Turkmenistan	TKM	Turkmenistan, Ashgabat
Slovenia	SVN	Slovenia, Ljubljana	Uganda	UGA	Uganda, Kampala
Somalia	SOM	Somalia, Mogadishu	Ukraine	UKR	Ukraine, Kyiv
South Africa	ZAF	South Africa, Capetown	United Arab Emirates (the)	ARE	Dubai
		South Africa, Durban			United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi
		South Africa, Johannesburg	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the)	GBR	United Kingdom, Belfast
		South Africa, Pretoria			United Kingdom, Edinburgh
South Sudan	SSD	Southern Sudan, Juba	Ireland (the)	GBR	United Kingdom, London
Spain	ESP	Spain, Barcelona			United Kingdom, Belfast
		Spain, Madrid			United Kingdom, Edinburgh
Sri Lanka	LKA	Sri Lanka, Colombo	Venezuela (Bolivarian Re..	VEN	Venezuela, Caracas
Sudan	SDF	S/USSESSS	Viet Nam	VNM	Vietnam, Danang
		Sudan, Khartoum			Vietnam, Hanoi
Suriname	SUR	Suriname, Paramaribo	Yemen	YEM	Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh City
Sweden	SWE	Sweden, Stockholm			Yemen, Sanaa

Diplomatic appropriation codes

Country	Country Code	New Office	Country	Country Code	New Office
Zambia	ZMB	Zambia, Lusaka		Americas (general)	Americas Office of the Assistant Secretary
Zimbabwe	ZWE	Zimbabwe, Harare			Americas Office of the Executive Director
	Africa (general)	Africa Africa Regional Services, Frankfurt			Americas Permanent Mission to the OAS
		Africa Africa Regional Services, Paris			Americas Principal Deputy Assistant
		Africa Assistant Secretary for African Affairs			Americas Western Hemisphere Affairs Executive Staff
		Africa Office of Central African Affairs	Europe & Russia (general)		Europe & Russia Assistance for Europe and Eurasia
		Africa Office of East African Affairs			Europe & Russia Assistant Secretary
		Africa Office of Economic and Regional Affairs			Europe & Russia Deputy Assistant Secretary 1
		Africa Office of Economic Policy			Europe & Russia Deputy Assistant Secretary 2
		Africa Office of Executive Director			Europe & Russia Deputy Assistant Secretary 3
		Africa Office of Maghreb Affairs			Europe & Russia European Union and Regional...
		Africa Office of Public Diplomacy			Europe & Russia European Union and Regional Affairs
		Africa Office of Regional Affairs			Europe & Russia German, Austrian and Swiss Affairs
		Africa Office of Security Affairs			Europe & Russia Immediate Office of Assistant Secretary
		Africa Office of Southern African Affairs			Europe & Russia Joint Executive Office
		Africa Office of West African Affairs			Europe & Russia Nordic and Baltic Affairs
		Africa Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS)			Europe & Russia North Central European Affairs
		Africa Special Assistant for Press			Europe & Russia Office of Caucasus Affairs and Regional Conflicts
	Americas (general)	Americas Assistant Secretary for Western Hemispheric Affairs			Europe & Russia Office of Central European Affairs
		Americas Deputy Assistant Secretary 1			Europe & Russia Office of European Security and Political Affairs
		Americas Deputy Assistant Secretary 2			Europe & Russia Office of European Union and Regional Affairs
		Americas Deputy Assistant Secretary 3			Europe & Russia Office of Nordic and Baltic Affairs
		Americas Office of Andean Affairs			Europe & Russia Office of Policy and Global Issues
		Americas Office of Brazilian/Southern Cone Affairs			Europe & Russia Office of Policy and Regional
		Americas Office of Caribbean Affairs			Europe & Russia Office of Policy and Regional Affairs
		Americas Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs			Europe & Russia Office of Public Diplomacy
		Americas Office of Policy, Planning, Coordination and Press			Europe & Russia Office of South Central European Affairs
		Americas Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs			Europe & Russia Office of Southern European Affairs
		Americas Office of Regional Economic Policy and Summit Coordination			Europe & Russia Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance for Eur..

Diplomatic appropriation codes

Country	Country Code	New Office	Country	Country Code	New Office
Europe & Russia (general)		Europe & Russia Office of the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues		Indo-Pacific (general)	Indo-Pacific Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
		Europe & Russia Office of Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus Affairs			Indo-Pacific Public Affairs
		Europe & Russia Office of Western European Affairs			Indo-Pacific Regional Political and Security
		Europe & Russia OSCE Vienna		International	International Assistance for Europe and Eurasia
		Europe & Russia Press and Policy Outreach			International Civil Service Border Visa Examiners
		Europe & Russia Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary			International Office of Assistant Secretary
		Europe & Russia Public Affairs			International Office of Executive Director
		Europe & Russia Regional Political and Security Issues			International Office of Press and Public Diplomacy
		Europe & Russia South Central European Affairs			International Office of Public Diplomacy
		Europe & Russia Southern European Affairs			International Office of Regional Affairs
		Europe & Russia UK, Ireland, and Benelux Affairs			International Office of the Assistant Secretary
		Europe & Russia USEU			International USOEC
		Europe & Russia USNATO		Middle East and Central Asia (general)	Central Administration
		Europe & Russia Western European Affairs			Central Central Asia Desk
		Europe & Russia Yugoslavia, Belgrade			Central Chief Information Officer
Indo-Pacific (general)		Indo-Pacific Assistant Secretary			Central Office of Arabian Peninsula
		Indo-Pacific Deputy Assistant Secretary 1			Central Office of Central Asian Affairs
		Indo-Pacific Deputy Assistant Secretary 2			Central Office of Egypt and Levant Affairs
		Indo-Pacific Deputy Assistant Secretary 3			Central Office of Executive Director
		Indo-Pacific Joint Executive Office			Central Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs
		Indo-Pacific Office of Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Island Affairs			Central Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs
		Indo-Pacific Office of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam			Central Office of Pakistan & Afghanistan Affairs
		Indo-Pacific Office of Economic Policy			Central Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs
		Indo-Pacific Office of Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Maldives Aff..			Central Office of Partnership Initiative
		Indo-Pacific Office of Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore			Central Office of Press and Public Diplomacy
		Indo-Pacific Office of Regional Security Policy			Central Office of Public Diplomacy
		Indo-Pacific Office of the Assistant Secretary			Central Office of Regional Affairs
		Indo-Pacific Office of the Executive Director			Central Office of the Assistant Secretary
		Indo-Pacific Office of the Public Affairs Advisor			

Military deployment codes

Main Category	Category	Type	Main Category	Category	Type
Fighter Aircraft	Fighter Aircraft	A-10	Other Aircraft	Tanker Aircraft	KC-130
		AV-8			C-9
		EF-18			C-12
		F-4			C-17
		F-15			C-20
		F-16			C-21
		F-22			C-27
		F-35			C-37
		F-111			C-40
		F-117			C-130
		F/A-18			CT-43
Major Warships	Aircraft Carriers	CV	Support Ships	Support Ships	CV-22
		CVN			HC-130
	Amphibious Ships	amphibious ship			KC-135
		LHA			MC-130
		LHD			MV-22
		LHD/LHA			U-28
		LHD/LPD			
		LPD			
		LPH			
		LSD			
	Large Surface Combatants	CG			
		DD			
		DDGHM			
		large surface co..			
Other Aircraft	Submarines	SSBN	Support Ships	Support Ships	AE
		SSGN			AF
	Recon & Electronic Aircraft	SSN			AFSB / ESB
		submarine			AKE
		B-1			AKEH
		B-52			AKR
	Bomber Aircraft	E-3			AKRH
		E-8			AO
		EA-6			AOE
		EF-111			AOH
		EP-3			aux. ammo. carr.
		MC-12			aux. ship
		MQ-1			depot ship
		MQ-4			ESD
		MQ-9			fast support ship
		OC-135			FF
Tanker Aircraft	Tanker Aircraft	P-3			FFG
		P-8			LCC
	Recon & Electronic Aircraft	RC-12			LCS
		RC-135			LKA
		RQ-4			logistic & suppo.
		RQ-21			LST
		U-2			MCM
		KC-10			MCO
		KC-46			MPS

SURVEY QUESTIONS

What is the purpose of this research?

The purpose of the study is to understand more about how people in the U.S. think about a variety of political issues and foreign policy. For scientific reasons, you may be unaware of the study hypotheses and the specific research questions being tested.

What can I expect if I take part in this research?

This study is a one-time, online survey that is expected to take about 10-15 minutes to complete. Your responses are confidential and cannot be linked back to you by the researchers.

What should I know about a research study?

- Whether or not you take part is up to you.
- Your participation is completely voluntary.
- You can choose not to take part.
- You can agree to take part and later change your mind.
- Your decision will not be held against you.
- Your refusal to participate will not result in any consequences or any loss of benefits that you are otherwise entitled to receive.
- You can ask all the questions you want before you decide.

Please check the box below if you would like to proceed with the survey. By doing so, you are giving your consent to continue with the study.

- Proceed with the survey

What is your gender identity?

- Male
- Female
- Non-binary

What is your age? (enter a number)

What is your marital status?

- Single
- Married or domestic partnership
- Divorced or separated
- Widowed
- Prefer not to answer

Do you have children?

- Yes
- No
- Prefer not to answer

What is the highest level of formal education that you have attained?

- No formal education
- Elementary school education
- Some high school
- High school graduate
- Associate's degree
- Bachelor's degree
- Master's or professional degree
- Doctoral degree
- Prefer not to answer

People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the middle class, or the upper or lower class. To which would you describe yourself as belonging?

- Upper class
- Upper middle class
- Middle class
- Lower middle class
- Lower class
- Prefer not to answer

Do you identify with a religion or religious denomination? If yes, which one?

- No denomination/agnostic/atheist
- Buddhist
- Christian (all denominations)
- Jewish
- Muslim
- Hindu
- Other
- Prefer not to answer

What is your race?

- White
- Black or African American
- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
- Multiracial
- Other race
- Prefer not to say

Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your political viewpoint?

- Very liberal
- Liberal
- Slightly liberal
- Moderate
- Slightly conservative
- Conservative
- Very conservative
- Prefer not to say

In politics today, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent (or a different party)?

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent or different party
- Prefer not to answer

How often do you read or listen to news about international politics?

- Daily
- Weekly
- Monthly
- Rarely
- Never
- Prefer not to answer

Have you ever served in the military?

- Yes
- No
- Prefer not to say

Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?

- Most people can be trusted
- You cannot be too careful in dealing with people
- Prefer not to say

To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of the United States?

- A great deal
- Somewhat
- Not at all
- Prefer not to say

We would like to get a sense of your general preferences. Most theories of decision-making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. To demonstrate that you have read this much, go ahead and select red and green from the choices below. Ignore the question and just choose those two options.

What is your favorite color?

- White
- Black
- Red
- Pink
- Green
- Blue

Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Prefer not to say

Some say that in general, men are able to administrate a business better than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Prefer not to say

Some say that in general, men are better suited to lead in the military than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree
- Prefer not to say

How do you think the U.S. currently balances its domestic and foreign policy spending?

The bars below show the share of spending for each category. Please move the bars to reflect your rough estimate and make sure that they add up to 100.

- Foreign policy (example: military, diplomacy, foreign aid, etc.)
- Domestic policy (example: healthcare, transportation, education, social security, etc.)

How do you think the U.S. currently balances its military, diplomatic, and foreign aid spending?
The bars below show the share of spending for each category. Please move the bars to reflect your rough estimate and make sure that they add up to 100.

- Military (example: soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen)
- Diplomacy (example: diplomats)
- Foreign assistance (aid to other countries)

How do you think the U.S. currently balances its diplomatic and military attention in different regions?

The bars below show the share of attention for each category. Please move the bars to reflect your rough estimation and make sure that they add up to 100.

- Africa
- Americas
- Asia (Indo-Pacific)
- Europe (& Russia)
- Middle East

> RANDOMIZATION HERE | CONTROL or PRIME

Now we will ask you some questions about your opinions on the U.S. role in world affairs. Are you ready to proceed?

- Yes, proceed

How do you think the U.S. should balance its domestic and foreign policy spending?

The bars below show the share of spending for each category. Please move the bars to reflect your views and make sure that they add up to 100.

- Foreign policy (example: military, diplomacy, foreign aid, etc.)
- Domestic policy (example: healthcare, transportation, education, social security, etc.)

How do you think the U.S. should balance its military, diplomatic, and foreign aid spending?

The bars below show the share of spending for each category. Please move the bars to reflect your views and make sure that they add up to 100.

- Military (example: soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen)
- Diplomacy (example: diplomats)
- Foreign assistance (aid to other countries)

How do you think the U.S. should balance its diplomatic and military attention in different regions?

The bars below show the share of attention for each category. Please move the bars to reflect your views and make sure that they add up to 100.

- Africa
- Americas
- Asia (Indo-Pacific)
- Europe (& Russia)
- Middle East

Next are some pairs of statements that will help us understand how you feel about a number of things.

Please choose the statement that comes closer to your own views - even if neither is exactly right.

- The best way to ensure peace is through military strength.
- Good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace.
- Don't know

The U.S. should focus...

- More of its attention and resources on Asia (Indo-Pacific).
- Less of its attention and resources on Asia (Indo-Pacific).
- Don't know

The U.S. should focus...

- More of its attention and resources on the Middle East.
- Less of its attention and resources on the Middle East.
- Don't know

The U.S. should focus...

- More of its attention and resources on Europe (& Russia).
- Less of its attention and resources on Europe (& Russia).
- Don't know

The U.S. should prioritize the use of...

- Diplomatic power (over military power)
- Military power (over diplomatic power)
- Don't know

It is best for the future of the U.S. to...

- Be active in world affairs.
- Pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home.
- Don't know.

U.S. involvement in the global economy is a...

- Good thing because it provides the U.S. with new markets and opportunities for growth.
- Bad thing because it lowers wages and costs jobs in the U.S.
- Don't know

In foreign policy, the U.S. should...

- Follow its own national interests even when its allies strongly disagree.
- Take into account the interests of its allies even if it means making compromises with
- Don't know

For each of these regions, do you think the U.S. should send more of its diplomats?

- Asia (Indo-Pacific)
- Europe (& Russia)
- Middle East

For each of these regions, do you think the U.S. should send more of its military?

- Asia (Indo-Pacific)
- Europe (& Russia)
- Middle East

What region do you think will have the biggest impact on world affairs in the 21st century?

- Americas
- Africa
- Asia (Indo-Pacific)
- Europe (& Russia)
- Middle East
- Don't know

What kind of leadership role do you think the U.S. should play in the world? Should it be the single world leader, play a shared leadership role, or not play any leadership role?

- Single leader
- Shared leadership
- No leadership
- Don't know

How much confidence do you have in each U.S. institution to do the right thing regarding world affairs?

- White House
- Congress
- Department of State (diplomacy)
- Department of Defense (military)

What are the most important types of U.S. power?

Please rank by dragging the following types in order of most important (top) to least important (bottom), according to your views.

- Economic power
- Military power
- Diplomatic power

What types of agreements should the U.S. prioritize making with other countries?

Please rank by dragging the following types in order of most important (top) to least important (bottom), according to your views.

- Security
- Economic
- Environment
- Science & Technology
- Social Issues
- Space

For each of the following statements, indicate whether you agree or disagree.

The best way to ensure world peace is through American military strength. Do you agree or disagree?

Going to war is unfortunate, but sometimes the only solution to international problems. Do you agree or disagree?

The use of military force only makes problems worse. Do you agree or disagree?

When you think about Asia (Indo-Pacific) generally, are there specific countries that come to mind first? *

Please select between one and five countries from the choices below.

- Australia
- Bangladesh
- China
- India
- Indonesia
- Japan
- Malaysia
- Myanmar
- North Korea
- Philippines
- South Korea
- Taiwan
- Thailand
- Vietnam
- Don't know

How should the U.S. deal with China's rise? *

- The U.S. should contain China's rise
- The U.S. should manage China's rise
- The U.S. should encourage China's rise
- Don't know

*(at the end to prevent influence on other questions)

THE END